A Hilarious Legal Motion

I was chatting with my friend Ron from law school about a motion that he recently wrote.  It is over a dispute that is ridiculous on its facts.  Ron told me that it reminded him of the brief below.

I never wrote anything as hilarious as this in my legal career (even though I may have wanted to).  Its kinda long but you can skip to the bold parts for an overview.

Enjoy the chuckle.

–
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works

934 F.Supp. 1395, Washington v. Alaimo, (S.D.Ga. 1996)

*1395  934 F.Supp. 1395

United States District Court,
S.D. Georgia,
Statesboro Division.

Matthew WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,
v.
A.A. ALAIMO, Judge; Avant Edenfield, Chief Judge; Dudley
H. Bowen, Jr., Judge; William T. Moore, Jr., Judge; W.
Owens, Judge; James E. Graham, Magistrate Judge; C.W.
Hicks, Jr., Magistrate Judge, Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV695-104.
May 17, 1996.

[West syllabus and headnotes omitted.]

*1396  Matthew Washington, pro se.

No attorneys for defendants–parties never served with complaint
or summons.

ORDER

WILLIAM T. MOORE, Jr., District Judge.

On April 5, 1996, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why
this Court should not impose Rule 11 sanctions upon him for filing a
motion for improper purposes. The motion which Plaintiff filed was
entitled “Motion to Kiss My Ass” (Doc. 107) in which he moved “all
Americans at large and one corrupt Judge Smith [to] kiss my got [sic]
damn ass sorry mother fucker you.” This Court gave Plaintiff until
April 25, 1996, to respond and specifically warned:  “Failure to comply
with this Order will result in dismissal of this case.”   Plaintiff has
appealed the show-cause order to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. As the April 5 Order was not a final order,
Plaintiff’s appeal is an interlocutory appeal and, as such, this Court
retains jurisdiction over the parties and matters in this case. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). As of the date indicated below, Plaintiff has not responded to
the show-cause order. Therefore, this Court DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE the above-captioned case for Plaintiff’s complete disregard
of and noncompliance with an explicit court order. FED.R.CIV.P. 41(b);
LOCAL RULE 41.1(b); see Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533 (11th
Cir.1985) (holding that district court’s power to dismiss action under
Rule 41(b) for failure to obey court order is inherent aspect of its
authority to enforce its orders). All outstanding motions are hereby
rendered MOOT.

[2] This Court also observes that this is not the first instance in
which Plaintiff has abused the civil right forum of this Court provided
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and finds that certain restrictions, as
outlined below, need to be placed upon prospective lawsuits initiated by
Plaintiff in order to protect parties from abusive litigation and to protect
the federal judiciary’s integrity of purpose.

On March 20, 1976, Plaintiff walked into a Savannah sporting
goods store and paid $149 for a 12 gauge shotgun. The next day, five
Chatham County Police officers responded to a complaint from a
woman on Stuyvesant street. She stated that she was afraid to sit on
her back porch because someone was shooting a gun. The police
officers investigated the incident and found the source of the trouble to
be Plaintiff, who initially confronted the officers while on his front
porch. Plaintiff then ran into his house. Two of the officers pursued him
through the front door while the other three entered his house through
the back door. Plaintiff could not be seen in the house and the officers
began searching for him. One officer, J. Waters, happened upon a closet
and soon thereafter  *1397  saw the end of a shotgun barrel coming out
of the darkness of the closet. Officer Waters warned the others to get
back and the shotgun fired. Buckshot pellets hit Officer Waters in the
head and Officer J.R. McNeely in the left hand. Plaintiff fired the gun
again and the second shot hit Officer Alex Hodgson in the chest; Officer
Hodgson died from the injuries sustained. Plaintiff, who had previously
been acquitted of another murder charge by reason of insanity, was
arrested sometime that day. (See SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, March
22, 1976, p. 1B.)

Plaintiff was convicted for the murder of Officer Hodgson and for
three counts of aggravated assault. On January 24, 1977, the Superior
Court of Chatham County (Cheatham, J.) sentenced Plaintiff to life
imprisonment for the murder conviction (Chatham Co. Indictment No.
25162), ten years for the aggravated assault of Pat Howard (Chatham
Co. Indictment No. 25163), ten years for the aggravated assault of
Waters (Chatham Co. Indictment No. 25164), and ten years for the
aggravated assault of McNeely (Chatham Co. Indictment No. 25165); the
sentences were set to run consecutively. The Georgia State Department
of Corrections committed Plaintiff to Georgia State Prison in Reidsville
where he is currently serving his sentence.

Since his commitment to the state prison system, Plaintiff has
become a frequent litigant within the federal courts seeking relief
through the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Clerk of Court for the
Superior Court of Chatham County has also informed this Court that
Plaintiff is frequently suing for various forms of relief through the state
court system as well. What distinguishes Plaintiff from most prisoner
litigants in federal courts is that he pays his filing fee rather than
submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. It has come to the attention of this Court that
Plaintiff’s litigation practice is largely, if not entirely, underwritten by
the Federal Treasury as he periodically receives a substantial check for
veterans’ disability benefits. By paying his filing fee, Plaintiff has thus
far avoided the filter of the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) frivolity review. As a
result, patently frivolous lawsuits have languished in this district longer
than would otherwise be warranted with other prisoner litigants.

Plaintiff has shown in his dealings with the courts in this District
that he lacks the ability or will to govern his suits with the civility and
order required by the Local Rules and by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. He has wasted the time of many an innocent party and he
has flippantly used the resources of the judiciary with his abusive
motions filing practice.

In Matthew Washington v. Bobby Whitworth, et al., 6:91cv87, this
Court’s experience with Plaintiff began. In that case, Plaintiff filed the
Complaint on November 8, 1991, and soon commenced his motion
filings practice. In February 1992, he moved to change venue. Then, he
initiated the trademark of his practice:  the Motion to Amend
Complaint. He moved to amend his complaint on March 6, 1992, on
April 15, 1992, and on December 14, 1992. After a couple allowances of
amendment, Judge Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., began denying Plaintiff’s
motions to amend. Soon thereafter he moved to disqualify Judge Bowen
and began filing “Extraordinary Motions to Amend” including one which
desired to add the United States Secret Service as a party.

Plaintiff began filing frivolous motions on a weekly basis and, in
that relatively simple civil rights lawsuit, he ended up filing more than
seventy-five pleadings, all of which required the considered attention of
this Court and Judge Bowen. These motions included “Motion to
Behoove an Inquisition” and “Motion for Judex Delegatus” and “Motion
for Restoration of Sanity” and “Motion for Deinstitutionalization”. In one
instance, he indicated the recreational tilt of his litigation when he filed
a “Motion for Publicity” regarding a trial which had been set for March
23, 1995, in Statesboro. At the time of trial, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to
Vacate Jurisdiction” which was denied. Even after judgment as a matter
of law was entered against him at the trial, Plaintiff did not perceive his
case as complete. He renewed the filing of “Extraordinary Motions to
Amend” and filed his appeals, fees paid, with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

*1398  After one year of motions filing after the case had been
closed, this Court ordered Plaintiff to quit submitting motions in a
closed case and directed the Clerk to return to Plaintiff any further
pleading filed by him. Plaintiff “one-upped” the Clerk when he filed a
Notice of Appeal from that order; the notice, of course, had to be placed
in the case file.

In Matthew Washington v. James T. Morris, et al., 4:93cv114,
Plaintiff set out to sue a host of individuals, including the Superior
Court judge who presided over his the Hodgson murder trial and the
attorney who defended him in that trial. Plaintiff filed the complaint on
May 20, 1993, and sought to amend it on June 7, 1993, July 21, 1993,
July 23, 1993, November 2, 1993, November 5, 1993, December 14,
1993, December 22, 1993, January 23, 1995, March 2, 1995, March
29, 1995, and on October 20, 1995. At least one of these Motions to
Amend sought to add Magistrate Judge James E. Graham as a party
defendant. Plaintiff filed fifty-four pleadings in that case, all of which
required the considered attention of Judge Anthony A. Alaimo or
Magistrate Graham. The motions ranged from the mundane, such as
“Motion for Change of Venue”, to the arcane, such as “Motion for Cesset
pro Cessus” and “Motion for Judex Delegatus”, to the curious, such as
“Motion for Nunc pro Tunc” and “Motion for Psychoanalysis”, to the
outlandish, such as “Motion to Impeach Judge Alaimo” and “Motion to
Renounce Citizenship” and “Motion to Exhume Body of Alex Hodgson”.
Plaintiff also filed numerous interlocutory appeals, which required the
attention and utilization of the resources of the Court of Appeals. The
case was disposed of on the pleadings in Defendants’ favor. Plaintiff has
filed an appeal.

Plaintiff’s other cases in this district demonstrate that his
litigation practice continues with the same themes as described above.
In Matthew Washington v. Dr. Joseph H. Owens, Jr., 6:94cv39, Plaintiff
filed some ten motions to amend, moved to disqualify the undersigned
judge, and also expressed his contempt for the undersigned judge by
filing a “Motion to Invoke and Execute Rule 15–Retroactive Note:  The
Court’s School Days are Over”. This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
complaint upon motion by the Defendant. The case currently is on
appeal. In Matthew Washington v. Ronald Fountain, et al., 6:94cv120,
Plaintiff has already filed thirteen motions to amend, including one
which sought to add President Clinton as a party. Plaintiff also sought
to disqualify the undersigned judge and again invoked the mysterious
“Rule 15″. The case has been reassigned to Chief Judge B. Avant
Edenfield and is still pending.

In the instant case, Plaintiff has sued all of the judges and one
magistrate judge from this District as well as one judge and one
magistrate judge from the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiff also
unsuccessfully tried to join Judge Michael Karpf of the Superior Court
of Chatham County and United States Senator Sam Nunn. His five
motions to amend are overshadowed by the “Motion to Kiss My Ass”
which Plaintiff filed (apparently to express his frustration with
Magistrate Judge G.R. Smith’s refusal to allow the addition of Judge
Karpf and Senator Nunn). This case has been pending less than one
year and already Plaintiff has filed three interlocutory appeals. Likewise,
in Matthew Washington v. R.D. Collins, et al., 6:95cv113, Plaintiff has
already filed three frivolous interlocutory appeals in a case which is only
several months old. (FN1)

In Matthew Washington v. Dr. Joseph H. Owens, 6:95cv214,
Plaintiff has filed a “Motion for Skin Change Operation” in which he
desired the government to fund a sex change for him. When Magistrate
Judge W. Leon Barfield denied the motion, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to
Impeach” the magistrate. He also unsuccessfully sought to add the
undersigned judge as a party defendant.

In another case which had been originally filed in the Northern
District of Georgia, 6:96cv54, Plaintiff sued the same judges as in this
case and also added Ted Turner of CNN International for good measure:
“Mr. Turner, *1399   a fellow Georgian, is and has violated the ‘Free
Press’ of which he ‘supposedly stands’ with his cartel and CBS
endeavors to do the same.”   Recently, he filed a “Motion for Catered
Food Services” in which he complained about the prison food and
moved for a court order allowing him to “receive catered food from some
credible responsible business establishment preferred and paid for by
Plaintiff.”

These are just some examples from some of Plaintiff’s recent
litigation adventures. Prior to this decade, Plaintiff had a long history of
litigation within this District. His recreational litigation has gone on for
entirely too long and at great expense to the American taxpayer. Too
many resources have been wasted and too many innocent people
harassed. This Court now considers what discretion it has to prevent
the future waste of judicial resources.

The appellate courts have upheld orders which limited a pro se
plaintiff’s access to the courts. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254,
1261 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that “[f]ederal courts have both the inherent
power and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from
conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions”);
Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir.1981); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d
285 (5th Cir.1981). The Supreme Court has clearly recognized the
validity of these judicially ordered curbs on abusive litigation. See In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 993, 996 n. 8, 103 L.Ed.2d
158 (1989). This circuit has also recognized the power of district courts
to strictly control the access which abusive litigants have to judicial
resources. See Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir.1993)
(per curiam); Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir.1991) (per
curiam); Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 936 F.2d 512
(11th Cir.1991); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir.1986) (en
banc) (per curiam).

In Procup, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, considered a
district court injunction which banned an abusive prisoner litigant from
filing any case unless it was submitted by an attorney admitted before
the court. 792 F.2d at 1070.  The Court reversed the district court’s
injunction but established that district courts’ have considerable
discretion in restricting an abusive litigant’s access to the federal
judiciary:  “We hold that the district court’s injunction was overbroad,
but that the district court has authority to impose serious restrictions
on Procup’s bringing matters before the court without an attorney.”  Id.
In so ruling, the Court observed:

Occasionally, a particularly abusive prisoner, taking advantage of
his unique situation, will come along with a flood of claims designed
to either harass those in positions of authority or to grind the
wheels of the judicial system to a halt…. Every lawsuit filed, no
matter how frivolous or repetitious, requires the investment of court
time, whether the complaint is reviewed initially by a law clerk, a
staff attorney, a magistrate, or the judge.

Id. at 1072.

The Procup court, however, reversed the injunction because it
found that the attorney-submission requirement could well have the
effect of completely foreclosing the plaintiff’s access to the courts. Id. at
1071.  The court noted that, realistically, the plaintiff would have a
difficult time obtaining an attorney for even a meritorious claim:  “A
private attorney, knowing Procup’s track record, might well be unwilling
to devote the time and effort necessary to sift through Procup’s
generally frivolous claims to see if there is one of sufficient merit to
undertake legal representation. A legitimate claim could well go
undiscovered.”  Id. This understandable reluctance on the part of
attorneys of the local bar would then amount to a closing of the
courthouse door for Procup and, de facto, his access to the courts
would be denied. Id. “An absolute bar against a prisoner filing any suit
in federal court would be patently unconstitutional.”  Id.

The court simply ruled that the district court had the correct
intentions of curtailing the plaintiff’s activity but had acted too
zealously to the detriment of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights:  “This
does not mean that the district court was incorrect in employing
injunctive relief. The district court was fully justified and within its
authority in entering  *1400  injunctive restrictions against Procup.
Such action is necessary and prudent to protect the rights of all
litigants in the federal system.”  Id.

The Procup court further expressed its strong approval of strong
litigation restrictions by stating:  “There should be little doubt that the
district court has the jurisdiction to protect itself against the abuses
that litigants like Procup visit upon it.”  Id. at 1073.  Further, a “court
has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily
encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others.”  Id.

Indeed, though the Procup court actually reversed the district
court injunction, the great weight of the opinion was spent apologizing
for the reversal and explaining that district courts may do many things
to curtail frivolous litigants except close the courthouse door:
“Considerable discretion necessarily is reposed in the district court.
Procup can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he
must behave in his applications for judicial relief. He just cannot be
completely foreclosed from any access to the court.”  Id. (emphasis in
original).

This Court finds that Plaintiff has abused the judiciary and that
his abuse has lingered longer than would otherwise be tolerated from
normal prisoner plaintiffs because of Plaintiff’s status as a pay-to-play
litigant. The time has come to take the rattle from the baby and impose
some form and discipline upon Plaintiff’s law practice within this and
other federal courts.

Accordingly, this Court hereby ENJOINS Plaintiff from filing a
lawsuit in this or any other federal district court unless the following
conditions are met:

1. In addition to paying the $120.00 filing fee which Plaintiff has
already demonstrated the ability to pay, Plaintiff must post a
$1,500.00 contempt bond with the Clerk of Court. (FN2)  This bond
will be held by the Clerk of Court and, if Plaintiff has conducted the
affairs in his case appropriately within the realm of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, the bond will be returned to Plaintiff at the
conclusion of his case. (FN3)

2. A signed affidavit shall accompany his complaint in which
Plaintiff swears that he has read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
and that he will abide by the tenets listed therein.

3. A photocopy of this Order shall be attached to his complaint.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to return any complaint from Plaintiff
not in compliance with this Order. (FN4)  If Plaintiff has complied with
the three items above, the Clerk is DIRECTED to accept the filing fee
and contempt bond and then submit the complaint, prior to filing, to the
judge who will be assigned the case. The judge or magistrate judge will
then conduct a frivolity review just as if the case were filed under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. If the judicial officer determines that the complaint is not
frivolous, malicious, or intended to harass, then the judicial officer will
allow the case to be filed and service to issue against the named
defendants. (FN5)

This Court is quite sure that, if the villagers who heard the boy
cry “wolf” one time too many had some form of reassurance that the
boy’s last cry was sincere, they would  *1401. have responded
appropriately and he would be alive instead of being dinner for the
ravenous canine. If anything, that story teaches that repetitious
tomfoolery can result in disaster for the knave. This Court will not turn
a deaf ear to Plaintiff’s future cries. However, it will require Plaintiff to
structure his pleas for help in a more sincere manner so that the
energies of the villagers are not wasted on the repeated runs up the
grassy hill atop which the mischievous boy sits laughing.

SO ORDERED.

(FN1.) Most of Plaintiff’s appeals to the Eleventh Circuit are dismissed
for either lack of jurisdiction or for lack of brief in support of appeal.

(FN2.) This Court bases this figure on the knowledge that Plaintiff
periodically receives a large disability check from the United States
Treasury. On May 14, 1996, Plaintiff had an inmate account balance of
$17,017.80. This amount included funds from a May 2, 1996,
$14,772.00 check and a May 6, 1996, $1,870.00 check from the United
States Treasury. Plaintiff may move this Court to alter the bond
requirement if his disability checks permanently cease.

(FN3.) This provision is created to ensure that Plaintiff will not act as
he has in the instant case in which he harshly abused several members
of the Court and the American taxpayers (who have completely funded
his litigious exploits) and then fail to respond to a Rule 11 show-cause
order.

(FN4.) The Clerk recently received from Plaintiff an application for
judicial action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (application # ST 96-78). The
Clerk will return that document to Plaintiff along with a photocopy of
this Order.

(FN5.) This Court observes that this requirement will soon be levied
upon all prisoner litigants, regardless of in forma pauperis status,
through the Prison Litigation Reform Act which President Clinton signed
into law on April 26, 1996, as part of the omnibus FY 1996
appropriations measure.